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Introduction 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) are the subject of 
intense debate.  While these funds are hard to define 
in precise terms, all agree they are government-
sponsored pools of financial assets.  With roughly $3 
trillion under management today and forecasts that 
suggest this number could approach $10 trillion in 
under a decade,1 many wonder what role these public 
investment funds will play in private markets.2  Due 
to SWFs’ government sponsorship, some fear that 
they will be used illegitimately to advance political, 
instead of commercial, agendas.  This geopolitical 
concern is compounded by a general lack of transpar-
ency and a perception among Western analysts of 
weak accountability and poor governance practices.3  
These fears are inspiring new rules designed to 
govern and regulate these institutions,4 and a series 
of new policy initiatives at the national and interna-
tional level are in various stages of consideration and 
implementation (see Table 1 on the next page). For 
example, the U.S. Congress has held hearings and 
established a taskforce to determine if SWFs are a 
threat that requires new regulation.  Australia and 
Germany have enacted new rules that address SWF 
investments.  The International Working Group of 
Sovereign Wealth Funds, with the assistance of the 
IMF, has developed the voluntary ‘generally accepted 
principles and practices’ for SWFs (also known as the 
Santiago Principles).
The prospect of new rules governing the conduct 
of SWFs raises the important question of which funds 
will be subject to such rules.  Many financial institu-
tions – especially public pension funds – are scram-
bling to differentiate themselves from SWFs in order 
to avoid increased regulation.5  Indeed, new policies 
mean new limitations on global investing, which 
would in turn limit a fund’s ability to generate returns 
and diversify risk.  As a result, how policymakers 
define SWFs is of the utmost importance.
To date, there has been some confusion as to what 
constitutes a SWF.  While all seem to agree that the 
China Investment Corporation and the Abu Dhabi 
Investment Authority are SWFs, there is a lively 
debate as to whether public pension funds, such as 
the California Public Employees Retirement System 
(CalPERS), are also SWFs.  While CalPERS itself is 
adamant that it is not, others disagree.6  The stakes 
are high for a fund like CalPERS, as the SWF label 
could come with a high cost.7
This brief seeks to establish consensus on a SWF 
definition.  Building on this definition, it then evalu-
ates whether a meaningful distinction can be made 
between public pension funds, such as CalPERS, and 
SWFs. 
By Ashby H.B. Monk*Country / 
Institution
Australia Published in February six principles to better vet investments by foreign government vehicles. 
Canada Reviewing its foreign-investment and ownership rules. 
EU Indicated that SWFs need to be more transparent and is reported to be considering new proposals. 
France Considering regulating SWFs and has called for a joint European response. 
Germany Approved a law to prevent foreign investors from taking large stakes in German companies.
IMF Developed 24 Generally Accepted Practices and Principles (GAPP)  for SWFs. 
Italy Indicated in October that SWFs’ investments should 'generally' stay below 5 percent of local companies 
(according to Foreign Minister Franco Frattini).
OECD Developing a series of voluntary best practices for SWF investment receiving countries.
United States Created a Congressional taskforce in March to study how SWFs affect the economy and national security.
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Confusion Reigns
On a mid-summer visit to Russia, U.S. Treasury Sec-
retary Henry Paulson told Prime Minister Vladimir 
Putin that he had had a productive discussion with 
Russian Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin about the 
country’s SWF.  Putin responded by saying, “Since 
we do not have a sovereign wealth fund yet, you are 
confusing us with someone else.”  To which Paul-
son replied, “We can discuss what you have called 
the various funds but we very much welcome your 
investment.”8  This brief exchange is illustrative of 
the confusion surrounding SWFs: while Paulson was 
correct – Russia’s National Wealth Fund is considered 
by many to be a SWF – Putin’s response is also justifi-
able.  A widely accepted definition of what exactly is a 
SWF has been elusive.  
Andrew Rozanov, a Managing Director at State 
Street, first coined the term ‘sovereign wealth fund’ in 
2005.  He noted that SWFs were “neither traditional 
public pension funds nor reserve assets supporting 
currencies, but a different type of entity altogether.”9  
Rozanav was right; SWFs are different.  However, 
three years on from his article, there is still no con-
sensus as to how SWFs differ from other public in-
vestment funds and how they should be defined (see 
Box 1).  In fact, Rozanov recently noted that SWFs “…
differ in size, age, structure, funding sources, gover-
nance, policy objectives, risk/return profiles, invest-
ment horizons, eligible asset classes and instruments, 
not to mention levels of transparency and 
accessibility.”10
Table 1. Examples of Current SWF Policies
Source: Author’s analysis.
Policy / Regulation
Box 1: Some SWF Definitions 
SWFs are investment vehicles funded by foreign ex- •	
change assets and managed separately from official 
reserves (U.S. Department of Treasury, 2007). 
SWFs are government-owned investment funds set  •	
up for a variety of macroeconomic purposes (Inter-
national Monetary Fund, 2008).  
SWFs are special-purpose investment funds or ar- •	
rangements that are owned by the general govern-
ment (International Working Group of Sovereign 
Wealth Funds, 2008a).  
SWFs are “pools of assets owned and managed  •	
directly or indirectly by governments to achieve 
national objectives” (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development: Blundell-Wignell et 
al., 2008). 
SWFs are “pools of money governments invest for  •	
profit” (Council on Foreign Relations: Teslik, 2008).     Issue in Brief 3
Indeed, the differences among purported SWFs 
are numerous.  According to a recent survey conduct-
ed by the International Working Group of 20 SWFs, 
most were funded out of mineral royalties (primarily 
oil); however, some were funded from fiscal surplus-
es, foreign exchange reserves, borrowings from the 
market and even divestment proceeds.11  Moreover, 
there was a straight 50-50 split among SWFs that 
were separate legal entities and those that were not.  
Finally, the funds themselves cited various objec-
tives, including fiscal stabilization, general savings 
for future generations, and covering expected future 
pension expenditures.  Undoubtedly, this degree of di-
vergence in fundamental characteristics has been the 
source of much of the confusion. 
Within the universe of existing financial institu-
tions, it is possible to distinguish between those that 
are private (e.g. corporate pension funds) and those 
that are public (e.g. central banks).  SWFs clearly fall 
into the public category.  A further distinction can 
be made among public financial institutions: SWFs, 
which are public investment funds, are distinct enti-
ties from central banks.
funds actually complicates the task because opinions 
differ as to whether and how further categorization 
can be done.12
A SWF Definition
There is a fine line between making a SWF definition 
too general (including all public investment funds) 
and too specific (eliminating some funds that deserve 
the SWF label).  For example, limiting the SWF defi-
nition (as the U.S. Treasury does) to those funds that 
receive their capital from foreign exchange reserves 
would eliminate well-established SWFs, such as Sin-
gapore’s Temasek.13  A critical and careful review of 
the existing literature and research is extremely useful 
in walking this line.  Indeed, emerging from this body 
of work are the foundations of a workable definition. 
Three characteristics emerge as crucial components 
of any SWF definition: 
1) Ownership: Governments, both central and sub-
national, own and, to varying degrees, control SWFs.  
Control can be exerted either directly or indirectly 
through the appointment of the SWF board.   
2) Liabilities: One point of agreement illustrated by 
the International Working Group’s recent survey of 
SWFs was that they “have no direct liabilities.”14  This 
is perhaps a surprising point of agreement, as certain 
SWFs do have liabilities, such as sterilization debt or 
some deferred contractual liability to transfer money 
out of the SWF and into the general budget or a social 
security system.15  However, the point being made is 
that SWFs have no outside (non-governmental) liabili-
ties.  For those SWFs that have a liability, it is typically 
intra-governmental; one arm of the government owes 
another arm of the government money.  For example, 
the SWF might owe the ministry of finance, the 
central bank or even the social security reserve fund 
money.  However, SWFs have no external creditor, 
which means the assets are not encumbered by the 
property rights of outside, non-governmental owners.  
In short, SWF liabilities (if they have any) are part of 
the broader national balance sheet.  
3) Beneficiary: Despite certain explicit goals (e.g. 
filling a future PAYG pension gap), SWFs are man-
aged according to the interests and objectives of the 
government.  As the accounting distinction underpin-
ning point 2 above suggests, the ultimate beneficiary 
of a SWF is not a specific individual.  Rather, since 
the government itself determines the SWF’s objec-



























While these are important distinctions to note, 
further categorization within the public investment 
fund sphere remains difficult; this is where the confu-
sion reigns.  A review of recent academic and policy 
papers unearths countless labels for different types 
of public funds (see Figure 1).  Mastering the lexicon 
is clearly arduous, but the difficulties do not stop 
here.  While some seek to highlight the differences 
and separate the various types of funds, others would 
like to include them all in a general SWF category.  In 
short, narrowing down the focus to public investment SWF PPF CDBP
Sponsor Government Government Firm














Example CalPERS General 
Motors
tive function, the beneficiary is either the government 
itself, the country’s citizenry in abstract, the taxpayer 
generally or is simply left unidentified.  This objec-
tive function alters the strategic choices made by the 
funds’ managers. 
These three characteristics suggest the following 
technical definition:  SWFs are government-owned and 
controlled (directly or indirectly) investment funds that 
have no outside liabilities or beneficiaries (beyond the 
government or the citizenry in abstract) and that invest 
their assets, either in the short or long term, according to 
the interests and objectives of the sponsoring government. 
This definition is suitable for three reasons.  First, 
it underscores the vulnerability of SWFs to political 
influence.  Because the assets are owned by the gov-
ernment and invested in accordance with its interests, 
the concerns surrounding these institutions are per-
haps easier to understand – whether these concerns 
are justified is beyond the scope of this brief. 
Second, the above definition makes no mention 
of accountability, transparency, or governance.  While 
some funds, such as the Canada Pension Plan Invest-
ment Board, have tried to differentiate themselves 
from SWFs on the grounds that they have higher 
than average levels of transparency, accountability, 
and governance,16 such distinctions seem to suggest 
that the term ‘sovereign wealth fund’ is tantamount to 
unaccountable, nontransparent, or poorly governed.17  
This is an error.  As SWFs become more transparent, 
accountable, or better governed, will they ‘graduate’ 
from being a SWF?18  Consider a different type of fi-
nancial institution: are central banks with perfect gov-
ernance practices and those with deficient governance 
practices all still central banks?  The obvious answer 
is yes; the same principle should hold for SWFs. 
Finally, given the heterogeneous nature of the 
SWF population, the definition does not use specific 
sources of capital (such as commodities or foreign ex-
change reserves) or legal status as a defining charac-
teristic.  The International Working Group’s survey il-
lustrates that generalities in this regard are necessary.  
Nevertheless, as the liabilities section above implies, 
sources still do have a role in this definition.  Indeed, 
whether the money comes from within or without the 
government has implications for the categorization. 
Are Public Pensions SWFs? 
SWFs have intra-governmental liabilities and ben-
eficiaries, differentiating them from other public 
investment funds, such as public pension funds.  Ac-
cordingly, the IMF eliminates pension funds from its 
SWF definition, noting that pensions, unlike SWFs, 
have specific individual beneficiaries.19  Indeed, 
pension funds are beneficial institutions in that their 
participants have specific claims on the assets in the 
fund.  As noted above, SWFs do not have this type of 
claim on their assets; claims on SWF assets reside 
within the government itself. 
Following on from the liability, fiduciary duty is 
also an important way to separate public pension 
funds from SWFs.  In the United States, fiduciary 
duty requires that all decisions be made with the 
beneficiaries’ retirement security in mind; thus no 
pension can place any other constituent above its 
beneficiaries.  In theory, this ensures that pensions 
remain focused exclusively on the maximization of 
financial returns, as opposed to political goals.  While 
in practice public pension funds have occasionally 
fallen short of this standard,20 fiduciary duty remains 
a defining characteristic of a public pension fund.  
SWFs do not have this kind of first principle to guide 
their investment strategy (see Table 2). 
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Table 2. SWFs, Public Pension Funds (PPF), and 




In order to crystallize the distinction, consider 
two similar public investment funds: pension reserve 
funds, which have a general objective to support 
PAYG social security systems,21 and public pen-
sion funds.  Juan Yermo of the OECD suggests that 
reserve funds are SWFs because they have no explicit 
liabilities (outside the boundaries of the government) 
and are managed according to the interest of the 
sponsoring government, i.e. alleviating future budget 
constraints stemming from the expected high cost of 
PAYG pensions.22  In contrast, public pension funds 
have explicit liabilities and an obligation (and fidu-
ciary duty) to pay public sector pensions.  Therefore, 
they should not be considered SWFs.Box 2: Why CalPERS is Not a 
SWF
   
It is not directly controlled or owned by the state.   •	
It does not manage state-owned assets.  •	
All investment policies – even those mandated  •	
through the Legislature – must not impinge on 
fiduciary duty to maximize returns for the exclusive 
gain of beneficiaries.  
Fund beneficiaries are public workers and   •	
retirees, not the state of California. 
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Why CalPERS is Not a SWF
All public financial institutions are to some extent vul-
nerable to political influence.23  CalPERS is no excep-
tion, as it has been subject to politicized investment 
strategies (coming from the Legislature) in the past.  
For example, California has enacted legislation requir-
ing certain investment policies, such as the divest-
ments of public companies that do business in Sudan, 
Iran and South Africa during apartheid.24  However, 
even in these instances, fiduciary duty remained the 
ultimate test of the policies’ feasibility.  The divest-
ment bills were all subject to review by the CalPERs 
board to ensure that divestment was consistent with 
the responsibility to maximize financial returns for 
the exclusive gain of the beneficiary.25  As a result, 
these policies were justified on the grounds that they 
would actually improve risk-adjusted returns, since 
firms engaging in commercial operations in Iran or 
Sudan were seen to be vulnerable to hard-to-quantify 
geopolitical risks – whether or not this justification is 
correct is beyond the scope of this brief. 
In any case, using these instances as justification 
for labeling CalPERS a SWF fails to recognize fully 
the nature of this financial institution (and the nature 
of a SWF).  CalPERS is not state-owned or controlled. 
California State government makes employer contri-
butions to the Fund, which are roughly matched by 
equivalent contributions by public employees who 
are members of CalPERS.  The independent board 
of directors, which is subject to fiduciary duty, then 
administers the money on behalf of the plan benefi-
ciaries.  Indeed, as mandated by the California State 
Constitution, CalPERS Board of Administration has 
the sole authority to make investment decisions on 
behalf of the pension fund’s 1.5 million active and 
retired public employees.  CalPERS is constitution-
ally mandated to maximize returns, which should (in 
theory) provide immunization against any political 
interference. Consequently, CalPERS is not a SWF 
(see Box 2).  
Conclusion 
SWFs are government owned and (to varying degrees) 
controlled, they lack specific liabilities and benefi-
ciaries outside of the government or the citizenry in 
abstract, and they are managed for the general welfare 
of the sovereign sponsor.  Held to this standard, Cal-
PERS is not a SWF.  Despite past investment policies 
that were seemingly based on political criteria, its 
strict mandate and fiduciary duty forces it to justify all 
investment policies on the basis of financial returns.  
As such, CalPERS, and other public pension funds, 
should not be included in any SWF definition (see 
Figure 2).  More importantly, they should not be 
subject to any new protectionist policies designed to 
thwart SWF threats, real or perceived.  This conclu-
sion is significant, as the alternative might have 
constrained CalPERS’ ability to generate returns and, 
ultimately, pay promised pensions.  
Figure 2. Differentiating Between SWFs and 
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Endnotes
1  Jen and Andreopoulos (2008).
2  U.S. Senator Charles Schumer (2008) recently 
testified: “The question of the day is whether these 
huge pools of investment dollars, known as sovereign 
wealth funds, make the U.S. economy stronger or 
pose serious national security risks.”
3  Clark and Urwin (2008) and Truman (2008). 
4  See Senator Evan Bayh’s (2008) op-ed in The Wall 
Street Journal. 
5  For example, the Canada Pension Plan Investment 
Board has taken great pains to differentiate itself from 
SWFs (see Bisch, 2008).  
6  For example, Benn Steil (2008) of the Council on 
Foreign Relations recently argued, “California runs 
the second largest SWF in the world…”, and Edwin 
Truman (2008) of the Peterson Institute has also 
included CalPERS in his SWF definition. 
7  Ironically, California’s legislature recently provided 
evidence of the potential backlash against SWFs.  As-
sembly Bill 1967, which was later withdrawn, would 
have prevented CalPERS from investing with private 
equity companies with any ownership by sovereign 
wealth funds coming from countries with a poor hu-
man rights record.  
8  Reuters (2008). 
9  Rozanov (2005). 
10  Rozanov (2008).
11  International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth 
Funds (2008b). 
12  For example, Mitchell, Piggott, and Kumru (2008) 
view stabilization funds and SWFs as distinct entities, 
while the IMF lumps stabilization funds into its SWF 
definition.
13  Nugée (2008).
14  International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth 
Funds (2008b).
15  Rozanov (2008). 
16  Bisch (2008). 
17  Instead, the Canada Pension Plan is not a SWF 
because the government has no claims to the assets in 
the plan, the assets are contributed by employees and 
employers, it receives no general tax revenues, and, 
by law, it is not managed according to the interests of 
the sponsor but to maximize investment returns for 
beneficiaries
18  SWFs are set up in response to the accumulation 
of wealth, while public pension funds are set up for 
the purpose of wealth accumulation.  This differentia-
tion has led Ambachtsheer (2008) to refer to SWFs 
as “accidental financial tourists.”  While it is true that 
some SWFs were thrust onto the global stage before 
they had a chance to set up the appropriate gover-
nance mechanisms, this is not how SWFs and public 
pension funds should be categorized – it simply helps 
to explain current practice within the two categories. 
19  International Monetary Fund (2008). 
20  Romano (1993). 
21  Examples of such funds include Ireland’s National 
Pensions Reserve Fund and New Zealand’s Superan-
nuation Fund.
22  Yermo (2008).
23  As Romano (1993) argued, “Public fund managers 
must navigate carefully around the shoals of consider-
able political pressure to temper investment policies 
with local considerations, such as fostering in-state 
employment, which are not aimed at maximizing the 
value of their portfolios’ assets” (see also Hess, 2005).  
It is this vulnerability to political influence that has 
led many to label CalPERS a SWF.  As Benn Steil 
argued in his Wall Street Journal article, “CalPERS 
is a political entity in every sense of the word” (Steil 
2008).
24  Munnell (2007). 
25  Indeed, the recent Iran divestment bill (AB 221) 
included the following sentence: “The California Con-
stitution provides that the Legislature may by statute 
prohibit retirement board investments if it is in the 
public interest to do so, and providing that the prohi-
bition satisfies specified fiduciary standards.”  Also, 
see Testimony by Chief Investment Officer Russell 
Read on AB 1967 (Torrico) – Assembly Public Em-
ployees, Retirement Social Security Committee, April 
9, 2008.  He notes that past Bills include a clause that 
reads, “subject to review by the CalPERS board that 
the actions are consistent with the board’s fiduciary 
responsibilities.”  Issue in Brief 7
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